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ABSTRACT
This paper evaluates the Swedish Riksbank's "Inflation Report" and draws comparisons among the
Reports issued by the Riksbank, the Bank of England, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. This
report poses and addresses a common set of questions about each of the three central banks'
"Inflation Reports". It assesses the credibility of inflation forecasts, evaluates the Reports'
discussions of the current state of the economy, asks if a coherent set of models underlies the













I was asked to evaluate the Riksbank’s Inflation Reports by Anders Vredin, head of the monetary 
policy group at Sveriges Riksbank. The assignment included drawing comparisons among the 
Reports issued by the Riksbank, the Bank of England, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. This 
constitutes the entirety of my instructions. The content of this report, therefore, reflects my own 
priorities and biases in monetary policy analysis. Although several staff members at the Riksbank 
have provided constructive comments, they had no influence over the report’s tone or criticisms. 
 
1. Introduction 
  This report addresses a common set of questions about the Inflation Reports produced by three 
central banks that target inflation—the Bank of England (BoE), the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
(RBNZ), and the Sveriges Riksbank (Riksbank). Although Inflation Reports are one of many 
documents used to prepare Board members for monetary policy decisions, they are primarily 
intended as external documents designed to communicate policy objectives and decisions to the 
public. This report evaluates both the internal and the external roles that the Reports play. When 
assessing the Reports’ internal roles, I occasionally sit in the policymaker’s chair at the briefing 
table. 
  Before launching into the evaluation, I should share some of my priorities and biases in policy 
analysis. To the degree possible, monetary policy authorities would do better to be forthright in 
their statements of policy objectives, their understandings of the economy, and their descriptions of 
current and likely future policy actions. Inflation targeting countries have taken the crucial first step 
by laying out the policy objectives unambiguously. 
                                                 
* I thank Jon Faust, Per Jansson, Stefan Palmqvist, Ellis Tallman, Steffan Viotti, and Anders Vredin 
for helpful comments.  2
  Limitations in our knowledge about the structure of the economy and our inability to predict 
accurately future disturbances to the economy make monetary policy an inherently judgmental 
business. Economic science has not delivered the definitive model economy. Instead, it delivers a 
wide range of models—both theoretical and statistical—whose performance varies tremendously 
over time. Judgments about the relevance of those models for the policy questions at hand are 
necessary components of policy analysis. It therefore becomes important how economic judgments 
are arrived at, how they are scrutinized, and how the role that judgment plays in policy decisions 
gets communicated to the public. Analytical and statistical tools can help to arrive at and evaluate 
judgment calls. But they cannot substitute for judgment. 
  Four questions form the basis for the report. They are: 
1.  Are the inflation forecasts credible? 
2.  How clear is the discussion of the current state of the economy? 
3.  Is there a coherent model or set of models underlying the presentation of the Report? 
4.  Does the Report hold the Bank sufficiently accountable for its decisions? 
  An appendix lists the questions along with the more detailed sub-questions that I considered. 
  This report is based on my reading of several issues of the Inflation Report published by each 
Bank; another appendix lists this reading. 
  All three central banks clearly lay out their inflation targets in their Reports. The rationales for 
targeting inflation and for the chosen target inflation rate are sometimes discussed, but the 
rationales are not typically part of the inflation objective template that appears in Reports. 
Nevertheless it is clear the Banks pursue low inflation because they believe it stabilizes and 
encourages economic growth. The precise mechanism by which inflation interacts with economic 
growth is typically not discussed much. There’s a good reason for this: the economics profession 
has yet to understand this important issue. Indeed, there is very little intellectual basis for preferring 
any particular low average inflation rate over another, although there is a strong basis for avoiding 
high and volatile inflations.  
  I have tried to be straightforward in my assessment of the Inflation Reports. That means I am 
also critical when I believe there is room for improvement. I hope the report is constructive and 
helpful. 
  I now address the four questions in turn.  For a discussion of some of the recommendations that 
follow from this report, see Leeper (2003).  3
2. Are the Inflation Forecasts Credible? 
  Forecasts are the parts of the Reports that I found most difficult to accept and to judge. For each 
Bank it is possible to trace how the verbal supporting discussion shows up in the inflation forecast. 
For example, the BoE (May 2003) clearly links short-run developments in the economy—in this 
case, a higher Council Tax—to a hump in inflation over the next six months. The Riksbank  
(2003:1) faults temporarily rising oil prices for higher than forecasted current inflation, but that is 
followed by lower inflation over the next year as oil prices unwind. Similarly, the RBNZ (March 
2003) attributes inflation fluctuations to changes in the exchange rate and migration inflows. So 
there is a definite connection between the economic facts reported and the shape of the inflation 
forecast path in each Report. 
2.1 Staying Focused 
  Each Bank emphasizes that there is no mechanical method used to forecast inflation. I presume 
that does not mean that there is no “algorithm” for constructing the forecasts, for that would imply 
that no systematic approach is taken. Instead, I think it means that no single econometric model is 
used to generate the forecasts reported in the Report. This leaves open the question: exactly how 
are the forecasts generated? This question may well be addressed by a variety of supporting 
documents, some published in Economic Reviews, some published as downloadable files on the 
respective web pages. But a reader of the Inflation Reports alone cannot discern how forecasts are 
produced. I do not know how thoroughly the policymakers in the respective Banks understand the 
forecast production process. For me that understanding is essential, but for others it might not be. 
  To be sure, each Bank collects and reports a huge array of statistics. In this regard, the BoE 
wins the “fill the bathtub” award: report as many facts about the data as possible, regardless of their 
relevance or importance. In the case of the BoE, and to a lesser extent the Riksbank, it is easy to 
drown in the bathtub of economic statistics; little guidance is provided as to how each statistic 
translates into the inflation forecast. Are equity prices, hostilities in Iraq, oil prices, external 
demand, consumer and business confidence, house prices, capacity utilization, fiscal policy, and 
labor costs—only a fraction of the factors mentioned in the BoE’s May 2003 “Overview”—all 
equally important determinants of future inflation? The Riksbank’s “Inflation Assessment” 
(2003:1) is less expansive, but still leaves the reader wondering what the contribution of each listed 
factor is to the forecast.  4
 The  RBNZ’s analysis is refreshingly succinct and direct. It tends to concentrate on a small 
handful of key statistics, giving the reader a better focused understanding. The RBNZ can 
nonetheless be faulted for not providing quantitative links between the key statistics and the 
forecast path. 
  Much of policy analysis is an exercise in signal extraction: what does the morass of economic 
data signal about future paths of inflation and real GDP? At its best, policy analysis extracts this 
signal by linking current conditions to future conditions, and leaves irrelevant minutia behind. At 
their best, Inflation Reports would do the same. 
2.2 Needed: A Model of Inflation Determination 
 Missing  from  the  Reports is some straightforward model of inflation determination—at least in 
the long run. One can glean from the discussions that at business cycle frequencies, which 
correspond to the Banks’ typical forecast horizons, the state of resource utilization is central to each 
Bank’s view of the inflation process. And at very short horizons, fluctuations in inflation would 
seem to be driven primarily by relative price changes—oil, food, taxes, mortgage interest, traded to 
nontraded goods—which change fixed-weight price indices. But what of longer horizons? Perhaps 
these are not much discussed because they extend well beyond the policy horizons on which the 
Reports focus. 
  But the long-run determinants of inflation are important because, regardless of the policy 
horizons in the Inflation Reports, one widely touted benefit of inflation targeting is the achievement 
of low inflation on average over time. By emphasizing the two- or three-year horizons common in 
Inflation Reports, central banks run the risk of losing sight of the overarching objective of low 
long-run inflation. 
  To understand this point, consider the standard New Keynesian model. In that model, long-run 
inflation is equal to the growth rate of the money supply less exogenously given potential GDP 
growth (adjusted for changes in velocity, which are usually taken to be zero). A lower target 
inflation rate requires a lower steady state money growth rate. Of course, with a Taylor rule for 
monetary policy, money supply is endogenous, so long-run inflation depends on the parameters of 
the policy rule (along with other parameters). 
  Over the business cycle, though, pricing is determined by markup behavior so real marginal 
costs govern inflation dynamics. This points out that over short- to medium-run horizons, resource 
utilization (or “overheating”) appears to be central to inflation, while over long horizons it is the  5
traditional explanation—money growth or monetary policy behavior—that is central. Of course, 
inflation targeting proponents argue that the inflation target itself pins down the long-run inflation 
rate (assuming policy is credible). But this begs the question I am raising: what determines the 
long-run inflation rate to be equal to the target inflation rate? 
  This theoretical argument is relevant for forecasting. In an econometric model of inflation, one 
might well find that short- to medium-run forecasts are driven by many of the factors on which 
Inflation Reports focus—relative prices, resource utilization rates, and so forth. But one would 
want to be certain that the model’s long-run properties are also reasonable. Those forecasts can 
often be nailed down by cointegrating relationships that imply inflation emerges from the 
interaction of supply and demand for money (or, more generally, the interaction of monetary policy 
and private behavior). To assess the credibility of inflation forecasts more completely, it is 
important to know about the longer horizon forecasts. None of the Banks regularly discuss this 
point. 
2.3 Needed: A Benchmark Statistical Model 
  All the Banks emphasize that their forecasts are judgmental. The view is that they can improve 
on model-based forecasts by bringing to bear the expertise of their analysts and a vast array of 
information not contained in a single forecasting model.
1 As a policymaker, I certainly want to tap 
into the staff’s expertise and exploit all available information to arrive at accurate inflation 
forecasts. But I also want to have a clear sense of exactly how the staff’s judgments are affecting 
the forecast. To gain that sense, I would find it helpful to have on hand a benchmark forecast 
produced by a good statistical model. The benchmark forecast would be entirely mechanical and 
untainted by the staff’s judgment. Any number of methods could be used to produce statistical 
forecasts. For example, Doan, Litterman and Sims (1984) show how to produce forecasts under a 
variety of conditioning assumptions. The typical Inflation Report assumption of a constant short-
term nominal interest rate, for example, can in principle be incorporated. 
  With the benchmark forecast to work from, the staff’s job changes somewhat. First they explain 
what is driving the forecast in the benchmark model. This is likely to be more of a statistical 
                                                 
1 It is not obvious that judgmental forecasts uniformly dominate forecasts from Bayesian vector 
autoregressions, for example. Leeper and Zha (2002b; Leeper and Zha (2002a) and Robertson and 
Tallman (1999) show that inflation forecasts from a modest-sized identified VAR are as accurate as 
the Federal Reserve Board’s Greenbook forecasts. This is not the place to pursue this debate.  6
description than an economic one. Then the staff can explain how their judgments shift the forecast 
away from the benchmark. Indeed, this explanation would be a central theme of the staff’s briefings 
of the Executive Board.  
  It would be interesting also to produce forecasts from the benchmark model conditional on the 
judgmental adjustments being made. One would have to think through exactly how to do this, but 
the spirit is to try to learn the extent to which the judgments are consistent with historical patterns 
of correlation. If the judgments do not disturb the historical patterns greatly, policymakers might be 
more assured. And when the judgments are at odds with history, the staff has a more compelling 
need to justify the deviations from the benchmark model. This approach provides policymakers 
with more information than they would have in the absence of the benchmark forecast. And it is 
information that is central to arriving at and communicating policy decisions. 
  Another reason for producing a benchmark forecast is reproducibility. At present it is 
impossible to reproduce any of the inflation forecasts reported by the three Banks. Yet 
reproducibility is a hallmark of science. The “science of monetary policy” would seem to require 
reproducibility.
2 Admittedly, readers of an Inflation Report may still be unable to re-create the 
judgmental forecast even if they have access to the benchmark forecast. But the Report could 
address this issue by discussing in detail the staff’s rationale for modifying the benchmark forecast. 
In policy analysis, as in research, reproducibility is tightly linked to credibility. 
  A track record of forecast accuracy is another important ingredient for making credible 
forecasts, as is a detailed analysis of recent forecast errors. In this regard the Riksbank does a 
much better job than either the BoE or the RBNZ. The section entitled “Material for assessing 
monetary policy,” which appears in the first issue each year, is an excellent addition to the Report. I 
found the assessment of why inflation in 2001 exceeded the target rate (and the previously 
forecasted rates) to be particularly insightful (Report 2002:1). The parts that attempt to identify the 
shocks driving inflation are especially good, and I would like to see more extensive treatment along 
those lines. For economics writing, this is about as suspenseful as it gets: I found myself hungering 
for more, as each potential explanation for the forecast error was proposed and then dismissed as 
unimportant. This kind of analysis is critical for both policymakers and the public. 
                                                 
2 I am borrowing Clarida, Gali, and Gertler’s (1999) phrase.  7
 The  Riksbank and the BoE also compare their forecasts to the forecasts of others. Although 
helpful, it might be possible to improve on this by giving some perspective on the historical 
accuracy of the alternative forecasts. How well does the Bank do on average compared to other 
forecasters? Are there particular states of the world when the Bank’s forecasts tend to be less 
accurate? Are judgmental forecasts better than the statistical benchmark ones? Does any pattern of 
forecast errors emerge when comparing benchmark to judgmental forecasts? 
  A benchmark statistical model can also help with understanding the source of forecast errors. In 
a multivariate model one can compute how the error gets attributed to disturbances in other 
equations. When the model is identified, equation errors have behavioral interpretations that greatly 
aid in telling a story about the forecast mistakes. Even when the model is not identified, however, 
equation errors can point toward potential explanations. Based on footnote 37 of the 2001:1 
Riksbank Inflation Report, I infer that the Bank’s statistical models implied that most of the error 
in forecasting inflation was attributed to the “inflation equation error,” which did not help identify 
the underlying source. This can happen in any forecasting model and the kind of analysis contained 
in the Riksbank’s Report can fill in the interpretation of what an “inflation equation error” means 
for policy. 
2.4 Simple Descriptions versus Simple Behavior 
 The  Riksbank’s simple rule of thumb—raise (lower) the repo rate if forecasted inflation is 
higher (lower) than 2% one to two years ahead—may be useful as a pedagogical device. It is simple 
and easily understood. Precisely because it is simple, it is also a very incomplete specification of 
policy behavior. It appears not to be state contingent, yet policy behavior belies this appearance. As 
a policymaker I am interested in the contingencies: under what conditions do I raise the repo rate if 
inflation exceeds its target and by how much do I raise it? Do I adjust the rate whenever the 
forecast of inflation differs from 2% or only when it falls outside the tolerance range of 1%-3%? 
That is, I am well aware that policy choices are not simple.  
  This underscores the tension between describing policy simply and implementing policy 
simply. But simple descriptions of policy need not require simple policy behavior. A policy 
institution that tries hard to communicate its behavior in simple terms may create an internal 
dynamic that biases it toward behaving in simple ways. And simple behavior is not a virtue for 
policymakers.  8
  Unfortunately, the rule of thumb, which was adopted primarily as a pedagogical device because 
it is simple and easily understood, may lead to misunderstandings when actual policy behavior is 
not simple. Heikensten (1999) is a thoughtful discussion that fleshes out the simple rule by 
acknowledging that the rule of thumb is not followed mechanically precisely because monetary 
policy behavior is quite complex.
 3 
2.5 Constant Interest Rate Assumption 
  I am troubled by the “technical assumption” that the repo rate is constant at its current level 
over the forecast horizon. The efficacy of the argument that a constant repo rate helps to 
communicate by being transparent hinges on the nature of the associated inflation forecasts. I 
looked at all the inflation forecasts from Riksbank Inflation Reports that are available on-line 
(1997:1-2003:1) and found not one instance when the 2-year inflation forecast fell outside the 
Riksbank’s tolerance range. Over this period the repo rate was changed 16 times, reaching a low of 
2.90% and a high of 4.25%. Inflation meanwhile, varied from about -0.5% to slightly over 3% (CPI 
measure) and 0.5% to 3.5% (UND1X measure).
4 
  These observations raise several issues. First, if the 2-year forecast of inflation was consistently 
within the target range, why was the repo rate changed so often? Does this imply the Board rigidly 
follows the rule of thumb by reacting to any deviation of inflation from 2%? Or do these 
observations imply the Board is not following the rule of thumb because it changed the repo rate 
even when the 2-year inflation forecasts did not indicate a need to change the rate? Second, given 
that actual inflation deviated from the target range—particularly on the low side—is there any 
systematic error in the 2-year-ahead forecasts? Third, since the technical assumption of a constant 
repo rate is clearly at odds with actual behavior, do there remain transparency benefits from 
maintaining this assumption? Fourth, how likely is it, given the current state of the economy, that 
the repo rate will remain fixed?
5 
                                                 
3 See also Heikensten and Vredin (2002). 
4 It would be interesting to examine inflation forecasts back to 1994 because the range of the repo 
rate expands considerably, reaching a peak of nearly 9% in the middle of 1995. If the older 
forecasts exhibit a pattern similar to the past seven years, the larger variance in the repo rate will 
make the “technical assumption” still more troubling. 
5 The Riksbank routinely discusses the economy beyond the two-year forecast horizon and 
observes that the constant repo rate assumption becomes more implausible over longer horizons. 
Leeper and Zha (2002b) point out that a constant rate may be sufficiently at odds with historical  9
  Of course, one reaction to these observations is that over time the Riksbank didn’t really hold 
the repo rate fixed. In principle, each Inflation Report conditions on a different constant level of the 
rate. Hence, there is no inconsistency between the fixed rate assumption and the 2-year inflation 
forecast. But then we are in a situation where we do not see the rule of thumb in action because 
given the current level of the repo rate, the inflation forecast is tolerable. I would be more 
convinced if the Reports showed inflation deviating from target under a constant repo rate, but 
being brought back to target through a higher (or lower) rate. 
  This brings me to the point that none of the Reports I examined discussed in any detail the 
economic dynamics triggered by a change in monetary policy. What are the effects of a change in 
the repo rate on Swedish inflation and output? Counterfactual policy experiments (or alternative 
policy scenarios) actually serve a dual purpose. First, they inform policymakers of the likely 
impacts of alternative policy choices. But second, and just as important, they demonstrate the 
dynamic impacts of policy. Only by firmly establishing that monetary policy can in fact affect 
inflation over the relevant horizons can the Bank begin to claim credit for improved economic 
performance. Without such evidence it is impossible to distinguish between good policy and good 
luck as the source of healthy economic performance. 
  This is why I find the Riksbank’s exercises that project conditional on a higher repo rate to be 
baffling. They appear to show that even substantial changes in the repo rate have little impact on 
the economy. Perhaps the nature of the exercise—raising the rate 20 basis points in one year and an 
additional 50 basis points in two years, as in the 2003:1 Report—does not lend itself to 
demonstrating the potency of monetary policy. What would the forecast look like if the rate were 
raised 50 basis points immediately and kept at that higher level for two years? 
  Another complaint about the constant repo rate assumption is that it may be another case where 
the desire to communicate simply could drive the Board to behave simply. Certainly Board 
members do not require the simplicity of a constant repo rate to understand the forecast. And I am 
skeptical that the public requires it either. And to the extent that inflation forecasts actually are not 
conditioned on a constant interest rate, the forecasts published in the Reports are potentially 
confusing to the public, who are forced to reverse-engineer the actual interest rate paths assumed in 
the forecasts. 
                                                                                                                                                                
policy behavior that it triggers the expectations formation adjustments that Lucas (1976) 
emphasized may undermine reduced-form forecasting models.  10
  As a policy maker I would eventually want to see a variety of identifications of the benchmark 
model. After all, identification is what most of every Inflation Report is trying to achieve. I think 
we would learn more if the identification were approached systematically and in a multivariate 
setting.  
  Finally, I am interested in forecasts that extend well beyond a two-year horizon. This is partly a 
check on the properties of the forecasting models, but it is primarily to keep my eye on the prize of 
long-run price stability. The Riksbank does provide a section that discusses the economy beyond 
the forecast horizon. I found this to be rather chatty, not well connected to the forecasts, and not as 
helpful as merely extending the forecast would be (unless after two years inflation is always 
forecasted to be exactly on target). 
3.  How Clear is the Discussion of the Current State? 
  The bulk of every Report is devoted to describing and explaining the current state of the 
economy. Indeed, this is the comparative advantage of central banks the world over. Here the 
Riksbank strikes a balance between the detail of the BoE and the succinctness of the RBNZ. It is 
hard to say where along the continuum one should try to land. Much depends on the tastes of the 
particular policymakers. My tastes run toward succinctness, as focusing on a small set of facts 
helps me to digest the facts. But there can be circumstances when the current state cannot be 
adequately described by a handful of facts and more detail is needed. In general I would apply a 
vigorous filter to the information included in the Inflation Report, making certain to exclude 
anything that is unnecessary. 
  An important aspect of the description of the current state is inferences about whether recent 
shocks will have persistent or transitory impacts on inflation. By linking the current state to the 
inflation forecast, this part of the Report demonstrates why getting the current state right is so 
important. All three Banks do this well. 
3.1 Needed: An Analytical Framework 
  What the Banks do less well is embed the detailed description of current data in an analytical 
framework that illuminates both why the data are important and how the current state feeds into the 
forecasts. The BoE and the Riksbank organize the presentation of facts into “supply” and 
“demand” or “determinants of inflation” categories, seeming to suggest an analytical framework is 
lurking in the background. But these labels do not fully substitute for a clear theoretical framework.  11
Aggregate supply and aggregate demand are not terribly useful constructs when a given shock 
hitting the economy has both supply and demand impacts. The Banks do categorize the shocks 
roughly according to their sector of origin: external or internal, financial market or labor market, 
and so forth. This categorization is helpful so long as the various sectors are linked by an analytical 
framework. There may be more that could be done in this direction. 
  The framework need not take the form of an explicitly specified theoretical model. Indeed, as 
our understanding of the economy evolves, so too do our theoretical constructs. Even a “model” 
that sketches out the important sectors and critical aspects of behavior within those sectors would 
help to connect the economic statistics to the forecasts and, ultimately, to the policy choices made. 
  Offering the readers a clearer analytical framework is also a means for educating the readers 
about basic economic theory. All the Banks do this to some degree—often in special boxes. And 
the BoE has had some very nice pedagogy that clarifies some issues that might otherwise worry 
policymakers (for example, on velocity in November 2002 and on TFP and capacity utilization in 
May 2003). In many ways, the Banks seems to handle these “topics courses” better than the core 
course, which is connecting current and future states of the economy in an analytically convenient 
way. 
  There is much that can be done to lay out an analytical framework short of specifying a 
complete dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium model. It would be useful to be explicit and 
quantitative about certain aspects of the linkages between current and future states. For example, 
with all the emphasis on how the degree of resource utilization affects inflation, one might imagine 
ways to show this empirically. What is the link between the output gap or some other utilization 
measure and current and future inflation? How stable is the relationship? On average, what is the 
impact of a 1% increase in the ouput gap on the path of inflation? How does the impact depend on 
the source of the gap’s increase? Is there a stable relationship in the opposite direction—from 
inflation causing future output gaps? How do we discern whether a statistical relationship is causal? 
Why is this distinction important to policymakers? What does the Phillips curve for Sweden look 
like? Is it stable? Are the judgmental forecasts of inflation and output growth consistent with the 
historical Phillips curve? I throw these questions out, not because I believe we should base policy 
on reduced-form relationships, but because once we have before us some quantitative links between  12
current and future states the policy discussion becomes more productive and the policy debate 
becomes better focused.
6 
3.2 Needed: Alternative Scenarios 
  Because central banks are so adept at describing the current state, I think too much emphasis is 
placed on it. This shows up in the Inflation Reports as well. The Report is supposed to be a 
forward-looking document, and every Report drives home this point. But most of the discussion of 
policy centers on the past: what did the Bank decide at its recent meetings and how did it reach that 
decision? It would be helpful to talk about how policy would respond if various alternative 
scenarios were to occur. For example, if growth in the euro area and the United States were to 
remain bogged down or to turn into a recession, how would the Riksbank react? One can imagine 
a range of the more likely scenarios and discuss their implications for Riksbank behavior. This 
kind of conversation probably takes place during Board meetings, but it would be helpful to have 
the staff think through the scenarios beforehand and provide some quantitative analysis to back 
them up.  
  As a policymaker I would also like to look at a variety of alternative scenarios for policy 
choices and their likely impacts on the economy. The Riksbank Report does routinely consider 
“forecasting inflation with a rising repo rate,” though the other Banks are less consistent in 
considering alternative policy choices. I was surprised at how insensitive the forecast is to even a 
75 basis point increase in the repo rate (2003:1). Zha and I found much greater sensitivity in U.S. 
data using an identified VAR [Leeper and Zha (2002b)]. The insensitivity can give the impression 
that counterfactual exercises are not very informative. It can also give the impression that changes 
in monetary policy have little effect on the Swedish economy. 
  Generating alternative scenarios is another instance where a formal econometric model is 
handy. Returning to the benchmark model, one could construct a projection conditional on hitting 
the inflation target and back out the most likely path of the repo rate for achieving this. This can be 
thought of as reporting how policy can get inflation back on target and how costly it will be to do 
so—an especially useful exercise when current inflation is above target, as it was in 2001. One 
                                                 
6 Recall that my perceptions of briefings at the Banks are based on the Inflation Reports alone. In 
most Banks many supporting materials of the kind I am advocating are put before Board members.  13
could run a similar exercise conditional on the judgmentally forecasted path for inflation (or paths 
of inflation and output) and compute how likely the judgmental path is given history.
7 
4. Does A Coherent Model Underlie the Report? 
  If one important component of an Inflation Report is the link between the current state and the 
objective of policy, another component surely must be the link between policy decisions and 
current and future states—the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. It is difficult to glean 
from Reports exactly what the Banks take that mechanism to be. Although both the BoE and the 
Riksbank dutifully report monetary aggregates, both also claim that the relationship between 
money and economic activity is unreliable. Is the reader to infer that the relationship between the 
policy interest rate and economic activity is reliable? And what about other aspects of the 
transmission mechanism? Does the short rate affect the economy primarily through the long rate? Is 
the effect of monetary policy on the term structure reliable? What roles do the banking and 
financial sectors play in transmitting monetary policy? 
4.1 More Quantitative Analysis 
 The  Riksbank and the RBNZ push the view that monetary policy has its biggest impacts on 
inflation 1 to 2 years in the future. But the Reports I read include no empirical evidence to support 
this view (though they might cite supporting studies). Moreover, the identified VAR literature does 
not deliver an unambiguous result for how quickly policy actions show up in inflation. In U.S. data, 
reduced-form analysis and recursive VARs frequently report a lag of 18 months before there are 
noticeable impacts on inflation [Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999)]. But in VARs that 
model the simultaneous determination of money and the interest rate, the lags are much shorter, 
even after imposing a zero contemporaneous effect. Leeper and Roush (2003), for example, find 
that when money and the interest rate are modeled simultaneously, inflation is significantly lower 
within six months of a monetary policy contraction. Moreover, inflation reaches its trough after 
more than two years, and it continues to remain substantially lower even four years later. In 
contrast, when the interest rate is determined before the money stock—as in most implementations 
of the Taylor rule—inflation is consistently lower only after 18 months.
8 At least in the United 
                                                 
7 Doan, Litterman and Sims (1984) refer to this as a “plausibility index.” 
8 See also Leeper and Zha (2001).  14
States, the jury is still out on how long (and how variable) are the lags between monetary policy 
and inflation.
9 
  The Banks seem to adopt an agnostic perspective on expectations formation. They turn to 
financial markets to extract expectations of short-term interest rates from forward rates and of 
inflation from the term structure. But they frequently refer to the recent past of inflation realizations 
as the primary determinant of expected inflation. Banks also rely to varying degrees on surveys, 
both of expected inflation and of business and consumer confidence. This agnosticism reflects the 
economics profession’s uncertainty about how best to quantify expectations. 
  Despite the prominence of expectations-related data, it is difficult to discern whether the Banks 
attribute a distinct role to expectations in private agents’ decisions. For example, Reports discuss 
the impacts of current fiscal policies, largely on aggregate demand, without mentioning how 
changes in expected taxes and government spending affect behavior. There is also remarkably little 
discussion of how expectations of monetary policy feed into current decisions about pricing and 
production. Yet stable inflation expectations are supposed to be a direct benefit of inflation 
targeting. It is difficult to reconcile the absence of expectations effects on private behavior with 
modern macroeconomic models. 
  All three Banks display a great reluctance to report results from quantitative analysis in their 
Inflation Reports. This is ironic given that the objective of monetary policy is described in terms of 
a quantitative target for inflation. To my mind quantitative analysis that explicitly connects the 
verbal discussion of the Inflation Reports to data goes a long way toward making the model (or 
models) underlying the Reports coherent and believable. 
4.2 Risk Assessment 
  Uncertainty plays a crucial role in policy decisions. Aware of this, the Inflation Reports are 
very careful to discuss the “risks to the forecast.” It appears that these risks are handled informally. 
Despite this informal treatment, the thoughtful analyses of the reasons that the forecast may go 
wrong and the likely direction of the error are indispensable to policymakers. 
 The  BoE and the Riksbank present fan charts for their inflation forecasts.
10 (The BoE also does 
so for output forecasts.) The charts report both the central tendency—typically the mode—and the 
                                                 
9 Identification schemes based on shape and sign restrictions on impulse response functions that do 
not impose predeterminedness of inflation can even get substantial immediate responses of inflation 
to a monetary policy shock [see Canova and De Nicolo (1998), Faust (1998), and Uhlig (1997)].  15
dispersion of the forecast density function.
11 The risk assessment embodied in the fan charts is 
arrived at judgmentally, as Blix and Sellin (1999) describe.
12 To the extent that the fan charts 
accurately reflect the risks discussed in the text of the Reports, there appear to be at least two kinds 
of uncertainty captured: uncertainty about realizations of future shocks and uncertainty about the 
underlying model. It is unclear whether a third kind of uncertainty—that arising from parameter 
estimates—is also rolled into the fan charts.
13 
  Uncertainty about future shocks and model uncertainty seem often to interact in the Inflation 
Reports. Consider an example that runs through the three Banks’ Reports: the possibility that 
external demand may turn out to be weaker (or stronger) than anticipated. At times this uncertainty 
increases, widening the fans, and in early 2003 external demand is more likely to be weaker than to 
be stronger, skewing the distribution of the inflation forecast downward. I interpret the widening of 
the fans as stemming from a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of shocks affecting the 
strength of foreign economies. But if shocks continue to have mean zero, which they must if they 
are “shocks,” then the change in bias must arise from something like changes in the parameters in 
private agents’ decision rules. The Riksbank mentions the interesting possibility that 9/11 and the 
Iraq situation may have increased risk aversion, making private decisions more conservative than 
usual. One way to think about this is that nonlinearities may be important, possibly because some 
set of parameters describing private behavior can shift stochastically over time in response to 
exogenous events. Of course attitudes toward risk are not observable, so it is important to 
acknowledge that we are choosing to interpret observed behavior in these terms. It may be possible 
to formalize this as uncertainty about the underlying model: there are two models with different 
                                                                                                                                                                
10 The RBNZ reports only a central tendency measure in its forecast charts even though its 
Monetary Policy Statement discusses the risks to the forecast. It is interesting to ask why the RBNZ 
chose not to produce fan charts. 
11 Considering that the forecasts reported come from a single judgmental forecast, it is not clear 
why the forecast is treated as a mode. 
12 There is a peculiar asymmetry implicit in the production of the fan charts. Forecasts are explicitly 
judgmental, as are the staff’s assessment of the degree of and bias in the uncertainty. Yet, as Blix 
and Sellin (1999) describe the procedure for producing fan charts, those judgmental components 
are inputted into a formula that produces the charts. This procedure seems to attempt to make 
objective the output of a process that is intrinsically subjective. 
13 Parameter uncertainty arises because model parameters are estimated rather than known with 
certainty. In typical applications, the model structure is taken as known with certainty, even when 
the parameter values are not. Model uncertainty reflects a more fundamental uncertainty stemming 
from the fact that we do not even know if we are estimating the “right” model.  16
degrees of risk aversion; the mode of the forecast averages the two models and the skewness 
reflects both our prior beliefs about and the fit of the two competing models.
14 
  As one can see, a formal interpretation of the fan charts can be quite complex. But even if a 
Bank does not choose the formal approach, it is important to think carefully about the nature of the 
uncertainty being captured by the risk analysis. As a policymaker, I would want clarification of 
precisely what information the fan charts communicate. I would also want to know the extent to 
which the staff accounts for parameter uncertainty when reporting the risks. 
4.3 Evaluate Risk Assessments 
  If Banks routinely report risk assessments, then those assessments should be systematically 
evaluated, just as the accuracy of Banks’ inflation forecasts are evaluated. Here two aspects suggest 
themselves.
15 First, if the main scenario in the Inflation Reports is a mode forecast, then we ought 
to observe that times when risks are tilted in favor of higher (lower) inflation tend to be followed by 
actual inflation rates that are greater (less than) forecasted inflation rates. If such an analysis finds 
no systematic connection between risk assessments and forecast errors, then the value of the risk 
assessments is called into question. 
  A second type of evaluation attempts to put risk assessments into a historical context. The 
Riksbank’s annual section on “Materials for assessing monetary policy” includes a table that 
summarizes whether uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecast is “normal,” “somewhat more 
than normal,” “more than normal,” “somewhat less than normal,” or “less than normal.” Over a 
long enough time period, these assessments, of course, should average out to “normal.” But over 
the past few years I could find no instance when uncertainty was less than normal. This may have 
been a particularly volatile period or it may be a case where uncertainty tends always to be greater 
than normal.
16 In either case, this is the kind of internal consistency check that judgmental forecasts 
require, but that statistical forecasts automatically ensure. 
                                                 
14 Brock, Durlauf and West (2003) is an excellent development of model uncertainty and model 
averaging in the context of stylized policy evaluation. Robertson, Tallman and Whiteman (2002) 
offer an alternative approach to producing forecast distributions that is not explicitly tied to model 
uncertainty. 
15 Actually, Stefan Palmqvist suggested these, and I thank him. 
16 As in Garrison Keillor’s Lake Wobegone, Minnesota on the radio show “A Prairie Home 
Companion,” where all the children are above average.  17
  A serious limitation of the informal—meaning not model-based—handling of uncertainty is 
that it precludes reporting joint distributions of forecasted variables. Fan charts exist, implicitly at 
least, for both inflation and output growth. We know these are marginal distributions obtained from 
some joint distribution. But without knowledge of the joint distribution, policymakers cannot be 
informed of the probabilistic trade-offs associated with their policy choices. Even the most hard-
line inflation targeting Bank frequently trades off hitting the target in the short run when the output 
costs of doing so are judged to be too high. Information from the joint distribution also helps 
policymakers assess the plausibility of the combined inflation and output forecasts.  
  Leeper and Zha (2002b; Leeper and Zha (2002a) explore this issue in some detail. Using an 
identified Bayesian VAR we simulate the joint posterior distribution of all the variables in the 
model. We construct projections of macro variables conditional on alternative paths for the policy 
instrument. In addition to reporting forecasts with error bands—the marginal distributions—we 
compute a variety of joint distributions.
17 These joint distributions allow the policymakers to ask 
complicated questions like: “What is the probability of a recession in the next two years and 
inflation below the target range under the following alternative policy choices?” This is precisely 
the kind of question that policymakers ask and to which Bank staffs have a difficult time providing 
quantitative answers. 
5. Does the Report Hold the Bank Sufficiently Accountable? 
  Given the relatively benign economic conditions of the past few years, the Banks do take 
ownership of their decisions and any mistakes they made. There is much in all the Reports that 
speaks to this point. The Riksbank appears to be the most forthcoming in this respect, however. 
The section on assessing monetary policy is central to the mission of accountability. There are ways 
that I have mentioned by which that section can be strengthened to help make the forecasts more 
credible. Comparisons of rule-based monetary policies to actual policies—as the Riksbank 
2003:1 Report does—can also be helpful in holding the Bank accountable. But of course those 
exercises are only as useful as the rules to which actual behavior is being compared. I am perhaps 
an outlier in that I do not use the Taylor rule as a litmus test for policy behavior, though as one of 
several rules studied it may be instructive. 
                                                 
17 The joint posterior distribution reflects uncertainty about estimated parameters and about future 
shocks. The latter distribution is symmetric by assumption, but the former can be highly skewed.  18
  Of course, in the past few years, the mistakes made by forecasts have been small. All Banks 
acknowledge throughout their Reports where their earlier views of the economy have turned out to 
be mistaken. The Riksbank devoted a great deal of careful analysis to a miss in inflation of less 
than one percentage point in 2001. The real question is how will the Reports read if the mistakes 
are substantially larger? If the miss is on the order of 5 (or -5) percentage points will the Banks be 
as forthcoming? 
  There are two categories of accountability worth considering. The first is institutional versus 
individual accountability and the second is retrospective versus real-time accountability. Inflation 
Reports are quite conscientious in addressing institutional accountability retrospectively. But there 
could be more individual accountability taking place in real time. 
  Individual accountability simply refers to the fact that policy boards consist of several 
members, each of whom participates in the policy debates and may even vote on the policy 
decisions. Because the institutional structures vary across Banks, I will focus on the Riksbank. The 
Inflation Report is intended to present the Board’s final majority view. The annual “Material for 
assessing monetary policy” section of the Report does discuss in general terms whether certain 
members expressed views contrary to the consensus. That discussion is derived entirely from the 
minutes of the policy meetings, which are not published in the Report.
18 Because my evaluation is 
based only on information appearing in Inflation Reports, I could not glean a good understanding of 
the true nature of the policy debate. The brief synopsis in the Inflation Report does not present any 
detailed alternative scenarios that were advocated by members for how policy might behave and 
how that behavior would affect the economy. Hence, based on Reports alone, I cannot infer 
accurately the degree to which individual Board members are held accountable for their decisions.  
 Because  the  Reports report on past policy decisions and they do so with the benefit of 
hindsight, they also do not give the reader a real-time sense of the debate. Although there are 
individual decision makers involved, the Reports present a largely monolithic perspective on the 
economy and on policy choice. Is it really the case that all Board members based their decisions on 
the identical set of information and the identical model of the economy, as the Report would seem 
to suggest? Or do some members come to the policy meeting with different information and a 
                                                 
18 But are available on-line at http://www.riksbank.se under “Top News.”  19
different model of how the economy works and how monetary policy affects the economy? If this 
kind of heterogeneity exists among Board members, it ought to be communicated in the Report. 
  One way to approach this is to have Board members keep journals that record in real time their 
reactions to the economic facts presented in the Report. They could record when the facts and the 
Report’s interpretations of them accord with or differ from their own perceptions. Presumably, 
those differences form the basis for the policy debate and may underlie any decision to dissent from 
the majority opinion. Members will discover ex-post the extent to which they were right or wrong 
in their perceptions. Of course, this must be done in real time to ensure that members do not revise 
their own histories. This is essentially a micro- (individual-) level analysis of the sort already 
conducted in the “assessing monetary policy” sections of the Report. If this procedure is followed 
systematically, the individual members each acquire their own track record on policy decisions, 
which is a necessary step toward individual accountability. 
  A possible counter-argument to this proposal for enhanced individual accountability is that the 
appearance of too much disagreement among Board members may undermine the Bank’s 
credibility and disrupt financial markets. I am certain officials in the Federal Reserve System would 
push this argument. To be sure, in the United States at least, there would be some journalists and 
pundits who would spout that anything other than harmonious consensus among Board members 
signals the end of sound monetary policy. But policymakers cannot be deterred by such criticism. 
  I think the opposite could occur. Seeing that central bank officials are subjecting their 
viewpoints to careful scrutiny is likely to reassure the public that monetary policy decisions are in 
responsible hands. Healthy debate is an integral part of the democratic process. Moreover, if 
members know they are expected to make cogent and public arguments for their positions, the 
quality and thoughtfulness of their remarks will rise. 
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Appendix A: Questions Addressed 
 
  The report is organized around general aspects of Inflation Reports from the three countries. I 
address the following issues: 
1.  Are the inflation forecasts credible? 
a)  Are the determinants of inflation clearly laid out? 
b)  Is the procedure for producing forecasts clearly explained? 
c)  Are the forecasts reproducible? 
d)  Can one distinguish between “objective” and “subjective” (or judgmental) aspects of the 
forecast? 
e)  How reasonable is the “technical assumption” of a constant policy interest rate over the 
forecast horizon? 
f)  Is there a track record of forecast accuracy to which the Report alludes and which the 
Report updates? 
g)  Is there a detailed discussion of recent forecast errors, including potential sources of the 
errors and implications of the errors for current and future policy choices? 
2.  How clear is the discussion of the current state of the economy? 
a)  Does the reader acquire an understanding of the economic events that produced the current 
state? 
b)  Is it explained why knowledge of the current state is relevant for achieving the stated 
objectives of policy? 
c)  Are data and analyses presented pertinent? 
d)  Does the Report devote too much attention to the current state relative to likely future paths 
of the economy? 
e)  What is the balance between discussion of current and future policy choices? 
f)  Are all necessary inputs to the decision process presented and discussed? 
3.  Is there a coherent model or set of models underlying the presentation of the Report? 
a)  Is there a clear connection between the Bank’s view of the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy and the data presented? 
b)  How is uncertainty handled? 
(i)  uncertainty about estimated parameters  21
(ii) uncertainty about realizations of future shocks 
(iii)uncertainty about underlying economic model 
c)  What type of uncertainty do fan charts purport to capture? 
4.  Does the Report hold the Bank sufficiently accountable for its decisions? 
a)  Does the Bank take ownership of its decisions and any mistakes policy made? 
b)  Institutional versus individual accountability 
c)  Retrospective versus real-time accountability  22
Appendix B: Background Reading 
 
  My report is based on a reading of the following Inflation Reports: 
 
Bank of England, Inflation Report, May 2002, November 2002, February 2003, May 2003. 
 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Monetary Policy Statement, March 2002, November 2002, March  
2003. 
 
Sveriges Riksbank, Inflation Report, 2000:1, 2001:2, 2002:1, 2002:3, 2002:4, 2003:1, and portions 
of Reports dating back to 1997:1.  23
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